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1. Introduction 
 
“John, I can’t make a damn thing out of this tax problem. I listen to one side and they seem right, and 
then – God! – I talk to the other side, and they seem just as right. I know somewhere there is a book, 
that will give me the truth, but hell, I couldn’t read the book. I know somewhere there is an economist 
who knows the truth, but I don’t know where to find him and haven’t the sense to know and trust him 
when I find him. God, what a job!” 
 
Warren G. Harding, US president (1920-1924) in a conversation with his assistant. 
 
Economists are often portrayed as a quarrelsome lot. Paul Krugman (1994) stamps his feet about 
the stupidity of ‘madmen in authority’ like Laura Tyson and Robert Reich; Joe Stiglitz (2002) 
denounces the ‘one-size-fits-all’ attitude of IMF-advisors in East Asia, Latin America and Russia; 
and Ronald Coase (1998: 577) also acknowledges, as a sadder and wiser sage, that “I find it 
difficult to ignore the role of stupidity in human affairs.” Policy makers, in turn, who want to have 
sound economic advice throw their hands in the air, despairing the inconclusiveness of the state of 
economic knowledge. President Harding had a hard time figuring out who knew the truth among his 
economic advisors and many a president today would mumble the same words. Why can’t these 
economists decide what is the right thing to do? Surely, there must be some theory that survives all 
tests imaginable. The problem that outsiders, and even some insiders, are confronted with when they 
enter a conversation in economics is the idea of pluralism: the fact that there are many organising 
principles about one and the same phenomenon. And pluralism magnifies the decision problem, not 
only does one need to deal with theoretically derived trade-offs, but who is going to tell the 
difference between one theory and another. It would be most convenient if theories have to pass 
some Darwinian acid test, so in the end there would only be one superior theory. Alas, that is not the 
way the world works. Nowadays the number of theories, methodologies, and specialisations is 
almost without bound. The editors of the Journal of Economic Literature (JEL) have to think of 
new JEL codes for new categories each year. The big issue is: is the pluralist state of economics 
good or bad? Without giving the entire content of the paper away I will evaluate the pros and cons 
of pluralism for economics, with the eye of an academic and that of a policy maker. By and large, a 
pluralist approach is a beneficial state of affairs as long as different strands of thought are connected. 
This connection refers to both schools of thought within a science (pluralism) as between sciences 
(interdisciplinarity). To establish a connection the maxim ‘Don’t specialize without intellectual trade’ 
is the most simple but effective guideline one can think of in situations of diversity. In that respect, 
 3
things look brighter than they did some twenty, thirty years ago. The present state of economics 
impresses me as a state of diversity with a common language binding the different strands of 
economics, the common language being good old ‘price theory’. In the “ordinary business of life” the 
present-day economists make use of stories in which ideas like externalities, transaction costs, 
asymmetric information, fairness and reciprocity abounds. The world of general equilibrium, 
modelled so neatly in the work of Arrow and Debreu, is slowly but gradually moving to the 
background as more and more economists realise that talking about real-life economies is going to 
be a very tough assignment if you are not going to deal with problems of information, knowledge 
creation and institutions, elements which in the end make economies ‘tick’. Thanks to the efforts of 
‘giants’ like Ronald Coase, Douglass North and Oliver Williamson on whose shoulders we stand, 
the horizon of economists has widened and their efforts reveal that with simple price theory you can 
transcend the narrowly defined resource allocation questions that general equilibrium theory poses 
and you can move on to understand a wider class of phenomena. 
After this short evaluation of the pros and cons of pluralism (in sections 2 and 3) the next 
question is how to educate future academics and policy makers and advisors to deal with a pluralist 
economic science. Are the standard economics textbooks well suited to deal with the present state 
of economics or is an entirely new type of text or approach necessary? I venture that these two 
options are both necessary: keep the core of economics, but improve the way students learn and 
practice economics. Even though I have no special affinity with the finer points of pedagogy, the 
present state of economics and the diversity of methodologies employed offer in my opinion a rich 
menu of stories to improve the present day ‘chalk-and-talk’ teachings of economics. 
 
2. Is Pluralism a Public Good? An Academic Economist’s Perspective 
Why do we need N theories about business cycles? Why couldn’t we be satisfied with just N-1 
theories, or let’s act the naive optimist, why not decide on one theory being the best? Although there 
are a number of definitions of pluralism this essential dilemma will be my point of departure. Pluralism 
is all about the multiplicity of organising principles (Dow, 2001) or to put is slightly different, it 
revolves around different theories about one and the same phenomenon. Now one may well ask 
whether society at large, and not the society of scientists - benefits from such pluralist sciences. Why 
pay for all these engineers with white collars when all they produce is brooha? In other words, is the 
diversity of theories or organising principles a beneficial character trait of science? 
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Competition 
The easy way out of this question is to murmur the cliché ‘it depends’. It depends on what you mean 
by pluralism. If by pluralism is meant the idea that two people talk about exactly the same 
phenomenon but the two use different concepts in dealing with their subject and as a result of this 
‘language problem’ or semantics cannot exchange ideas, then obviously pluralism is a ‘bad’. So far I 
am not talking about substance but only about exchange and competition. Part of the idea of 
academia is that each and every participant engages in the ongoing conversation in the community of 
academics and when this is prevented by a language problem the academic ideal of ‘community’ is 
smothered. But there is more to this problem, because when each participant restricts his attention to 
his own set of rules and talks to himself in the safe surroundings of his room there can be no 
competition. Even worse, there is also no check on the validity of opinions uttered, as scientists are 
not only producers and demanders, they are also gatekeepers of the academic conversation. Under 
such Babylonian circumstances pluralism is tantamount to excessive duplication. 
The trouble starts, of course, when you do start to think about the substance of ideas. It is 
troubling because who has the arrogance or knowledge to deem one theory better than another? In 
all honesty, no one possesses such knowledge although it is part of the game to advertise with the 
arrogance of young Turks that you do know. As Robert Lucas once told graduates on their first day 
in ‘grad school’: “We here at Chicago believe that what we do matters and is more important than 
events in Washington.” (cited in: Klamer and Colander, 1990: 129). Schools of thought have a 
function as they make clear that they differ and in order to differ each and every graduate student 
learns to utter the words of professor X or Z. Of course, what you end up with can be a pluralistic 
approach to the subject in which everyone seems to be inventing the wheel in an imperfect manner or 
in which each and every school seem to be in conversation with each other but in actual fact the only 
thing they share is an agreement to disagree. The capital debate between the two Cambridges in the 
1960s, lingering on in the 1970s, was perhaps the ultimate example of what Solow (1971: 10) called 
a “violent, unproductive, and confused controversy,” that nevertheless filled the journals of that time. 
The key to making pluralism work is the actual exchange of ideas. As McCloskey (2000: 
149) cries out loud: Don’t specialize without intellectual trade! The exchange of ideas is by definition 
a social phenomenon and this fact impinges directly on questions of theory choice and development 
in science. And although the noun ‘choice’ suggests that the neoclassical view is most suited to give 
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an answer to questions of ‘theory choice’, neoclassical theory remains largely silent on this subject. 
The reason why can be traced to the absence of transaction costs in the seamless world of 
neoclassical theory. The invisible hand of truth would direct us in the right direction. Of course, the 
question remains whether the metaphor of the invisible hand is an aptly chosen one. Can the market 
for ideas be mimicked by the world of Arrow and Debreu? I dare say no, and the reason why can 
perhaps best be phrased by citing Coase who criticizes neoclassical economics: 
 
“Exchange takes place without any specification of its institutional setting. We have 
consumers without humanity, firms without organization, and even exchange without 
markets.” (1988: 3) 
 
And the same applies to science: we have science without conversation. Trading involves costs and 
the same applies to economic science and at certain moments in time economists have gone to far in 
their specialization drive and even have reached to point of adverse specialization. The way we 
model science or research is essentially an intellectual exchange of ideas without talk or a 
‘conversation’. The ‘invisible hand’ view of science revolves very much around deriving rational 
choices of individual optimizers and aggregate states of the economy that satisfy some (aggregate) 
consistency condition. Perhaps this approach may yield a few extra credit points in the tenure 
system, but it does not adequately capture what’s going on in science. Science is about social 
interaction and choice and this ‘fact’ implies that apersonal models of choice will not do. An 
economist who throughout his career has paid close attention to social interaction is Thomas 
Schelling (1978). His claim is that the equilibrium analysis of markets is a large and important special 
case: ‘Equilibrium is simply a result. It is what is there after something has settled down, if something 
ever does settle down.’ (1978: 26) To understand all social phenomena with this simple model 
would therefore be something of a miracle and Schelling makes the point that interactive behavior – 
‘What people do affects what other people do’(p. 27) – is the key to understanding truly social 
behavior. Micromotives imply macrobehavior. Slowly but gradually this point has been catching on 
and is nowadays known as the complexity approach to economics (see Arthur et al., 1997; and 
Durlauf, 2001), an approach which stresses the interaction among individuals and tries to incorporate 
empirical insights from sociology, economics and anthropology. Interaction based theories are, 
however, not sufficient to understand science, one also has to explain how institutions - the rules by 
which the game of science is played – come about and change. In that respect, one can learn a lot 
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from what sociologists of science teach us and slowly but gradually one can say the same about the 
economists of science who are making worthwhile contributions (see for overviews: Sent, 1999; 
Gans, 2000; and Klamer and Van Dalen, 2002). 
 
Specialization 
One of the institutions that helps scientists cope with the problem of exchange is the clustering in 
groups and discursive entities (Klamer and Van Dalen, 2002). Scientists cluster in universities, set up 
barriers to entry, organize professional associations in order to organize conferences and issue 
journals, constitute schools, subscribe to research programs, develop specialized research 
communities which will organize specialized conferences and issue specialized journals, and form 
networks of like-minded souls. The reason why clustering is such an often sought strategy can be 
traced to economies of scale and scope but when it comes down to issues of communication these 
reasons offer no firm grounds and other avenues have to be searched. A well-known theorem in 
signaling is that communication is optimal when sender and receiver have an identical ‘make-up’. It 
helps explain why innovations in science are geographically localized and not evenly dispersed 
throughout the world and it also helps explain why professors of economics departments try to select 
staff who they can talk to. In order to make an intense conversation possible face-to-face 
communication with like-minded colleagues appears to be essential. The University of Chicago is 
perhaps one of the most outstanding examples in economics (Van Dalen, 1999) but the importance 
of geographic proximity runs throughout the history of other sciences as well (Zuckerman, 1977). 
 But, of course, science is no different from other areas of society and much of the benefits 
flow from the structure of science. Is science a close knit society or is every man or every cluster an 
island? The model in which we learn from others or in which we conform to opinions of neighboring 
colleagues or from neighboring disciplines is clearly a realistic one as the oeuvre by the 
bibliometrician Eugene Garfield (1998) shows when he models the entire world of science as an 
chain-like system. The basic feature of these models of learning is that people learn not only from 
their own experience, but as most experiments are time consuming people also learn from the 
experience of their peers. The central insight of the learning literature is that the interaction structure 
of individuals or groups of individuals matters a lot (see Bala and Goyal, 1998). The ‘learning from 
neighbours’ models is not only a plausible model at the micro-level, it is particularly powerful in its 
explanatory power at the macro-level. For instance, in theory it does not take much effort to start an 
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informational cascade when individuals learn by observing others (Bikhchandani et al., 1998). The 
role of opinion leaders or leading journals is critical in bringing about fads and conformity. It is in this 
respect that the Matthew effect in science (Merton, 1968) becomes dysfunctional if the ideas that are 
accepted are not entirely foolproof. Under such circumstances one can arrive at the case that 
behavior of a star, let' s say, Robert Barro running numerous economic growth regressions, is 
imitated because Barro makes it legitimate to do such simplistic research (and perhaps because it is 
so simplistic it is easy and inexpensive to copy such behavior). 
There are two responses possible in putting fad-prone scientists in perspective, a theoretical 
and an empirical one. The theoretical answer can be found in some detail in Brock and Durlauf 
(1999) who claim that the role of social factors in science is far more complex than is often 
recognised. They demonstrate that, under some plausible interaction conditions, social factors may 
not hinder the development of science but increase the degree of consensus around a superior idea. 
The intuition behind this finding may seem counterintuitive but it makes perfect sense because once 
the consensus of the community focuses its attention on the superior theory, this consensus will speed 
up its rapid acceptance. Of course, one can still claim that judging theories to be superior to others – 
a key assumption made by Brock and Durlauf – is a questionable assumption and a speedy 
convergence to only one theory may just as well be seen as a bad thing.  
The diversity of science which is central in Callon’s (1994) argument for defending science as 
a public good becomes a relevant issue at this point. Diversity circumvents science and in the end 
also society from becoming stale or as Callon puts it : ‘without this source of diversity, the market -  
with its natural propensity to transform science into a commodity - would be ever doomed to 
convergence and irreversibility’ (p. 418). What Callon does not deal with is the question of the 
optimal amount of diversity. Diversity as such is no great quality if each and every scientist has a 
different idea and operates as a lone wolf. Perhaps one of the reasons why European economics 
departments until quite recently have been such a stale territory for economists may be pin-pointed to 
this quality of ‘isolated’ diversity (see Coats, 2000). A complete consensus of opinion (which is 
behind the worry about Americanization of science) may also not be wholesome as it would destroy 
original insights outside the false state of consensus. 
The empirical response to the possibility of fads and ending up in a ‘bad’ state is that the 
evidence is mostly anecdotal and is not thoroughly scrutinized. A priori one would expect this 
reputation effect in bringing about cascades to reflect the property of increasing returns to the scale 
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of an individual’s reputation. The higher the reputation, the easier it becomes to bring about fads. In 
examining the elements which might make a scientific research article influential, Van Dalen and 
Henkens (2001) show that the characteristics of a journal (the reputation of the journal and its 
editors) overwhelms the reputation of an individual in getting ideas accepted. So the reputation of 
journals outranks by far the reputation of the author, a message that also comes across in a refined 
network-analysis by Baldi (1998) who demonstrates that the reputation of the author of an article 
does not affect the reception of published ideas, whereas writing in a widely disseminated journal 
generates a distinct attention bonus. 
 
Creativity 
But… science is not only about being connected and competing for the applause of peers, it is of 
course also about the ability to innovate. And in understanding science one simply has to deal with 
the aspect of creativity. The equilibrium approach surely has its merits but in matters of creativity the 
tacit principle of plenitude (‘every conceivable entity already exists’; see for a discussion Romer, 
1994) becomes a straightjacket in thinking about science. One could arrive at the rather bold 
conclusion of the head of the patent office who recommended at the turn of the nineteenth century to 
abolish the patent system because everything had already been invented. 
 
Triggering new ideas 
The key to creativity is the ability to play with a subject, by some termed as ‘blue sky’ research 
(Portes, 1997). The more original work is the work that dares to move outside the boundaries of 
economics and invades the turf of political science, public administration, sociology, anthropology 
and psychology. By demonstrating that your theory also applies outside the ‘sample’, you have 
shown to have mastered your subject and as a byproduct you make ideas or at least you make other 
people think again. This is the way to proceed when you talk about interdisciplinary research. 
Interdisciplinarity is a difficult principle and much lip service is paid to supporting such research, but 
the efforts by research foundations and ‘think tanks’ in supporting interdisciplinary research reflect 
the efforts of a man bringing a horse to water, but he can’t make it drink. Interdisciplinary research 
or policy groups are often a bunch of people put together, in the hope that diversity of itself will 
spark creativity. Of course, this is bound to fail and in fact most of the time scientists from different 
stripes of life that are living under the same roof are essentially ships that pass each other in the night. 
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To give researchers the chance to play their role as specialist and exploit their comparative 
advantage they need to connect. So they too are in need of a standard language or some common 
ground, sharing basic propositions or puzzles. It’s no good for economists to try to mimic 
sociologists or anthropologists in their use of methods (and the reverse applies also to sociologists 
who try to mimic economists). However, it is a good thing to trespass the boundaries that exist. By 
acting the imperialist the conversation may flourish and make an intellectual exchange possible, even 
though languages may diverge. To give a recent example of such a beneficial conversation, Akerlof 
and Kranton (2002) have started to re-explore the economics of education by focussing on the role 
identity can play in schools and along the way they incorporate elements of sociology, psychology 
and anthropology. However, this meeting of different minds poses a language problem which can be 
resolved by plain pedestrian prose but it can also be resolved by such trespassers or intermediaries 
in science as Akerlof, Schelling and Hirschman. 
 
Facing the real world 
But there is a different source of creativity and that is the world outside your window. The inspiration 
should be to look outside and try to make sense of what’s going on in the real world. Economics has 
on that count been too much inward directed, too much in search of questions posed by its own 
models. In that respect economics can take a more realist turn by moving inside the ‘pin factory’ and 
try to understand the management and technology of work, production and exchange. Of course, the 
true historian would say that there is nothing new under the sun. Ronald Coase visited American 
plants in the 1930s, he studied the monopoly case of the BBC and the FCC in the 1950s, Alfred 
Chandler tried to make sense of American entrepreneurs, Joe Stiglitz found inspiration for his work 
on moral hazard in the case sharecropping in India and his years at the CEA and the World Bank 
were also an inspiration to attack the governance structure of globalization, and recently we have 
seen initiatives by people like Truman Bewley (1999) and Ed Lazear (2000) and Alan Blinder on 
American business life, Diego Gambetta (1993) about the Sicilian Mafia, William Easterly (2001) 
about the reality of development economics or James Wilson (1989) about the inner workings of 
bureaucracy, and my own work together with Arjo Klamer (Van Dalen and Klamer, 1996, 1997) in 
discovering what makes economists tick, in science and in bureaucracies. Without intending to be 
offensive, economists should perhaps learn some investigative journalism: to note, watch and detect 
what’s going on in the real world. There are excellent examples of this research methodology. 
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George Lowenstein (2001) about the rise and fall of the Long Term Capital Management group, 
Dava Sobel (1996) about the priority race in discovering the instrument to measure longitude. And in 
reviewing endogenous growth theory Robert Solow suggested that “it would be a good idea for 
economists who are interested in endogenous technology and growth theory to do a little 
observational work on industrial research laboratories.” (The Region, September 2002). One 
reason why this has not been done very much is that “the kind of person who’s good at observing 
things like this is not necessarily the kind of person who’s good at making models.” I will return to 
this failure later on. 
The same realist attitude would also serve the methodology side of economics. 
Methodologists are often given the evil eye by practitioners. Irving Fisher could not suppress his 
disdain for methodologists in his presidential address to the American Statistical Association when he 
said: “I have usually felt that the man who essays to tell the rest of us how  to solve knotty problems 
would be more convincing if first he proved out his alleged method by solving a few himself. 
Apparently those would-be authorities who are telling others how to get results do not get any 
important results themselves.” In the age of Irving Fisher, Milton Friedman and Paul Samuelson the 
economist and the methodologist were one and the same person. But with the ongoing specialisation 
and professionalisation in economics (and every other science for that matter), methodologists and 
economists have drifted apart. Methodologists expound in a jargon that seems to be almost 
incomprehensible for the ordinary practitioner. In that respect, there is also a lesson to learn here as I 
think that methodologists shouldn’t drift too far away from their intended audience: economists. And 
I think the best methodologists of today, like Mark Blaug, Kevin Hoover and Deirdre McCloskey, 
have their roots in economics and are a credible and informative liaisons in conversation. The 
rhetorics of economics (McCloskey, 1983) is indeed Reality Economics of a different kind, viz. 
Reality Methodology, but one economists cannot do without. Linking the actual practice of how 
economists talk and persuade and pinpointing the pitfalls of that practice may one of the biggest 
contributions a methodologist can make. Because it is human to err, having professional gatekeepers 
– methodologists who know how knotty problems can be – is part of the institution called 
‘academia’. No markets for ideas without appropriate institutions, and having arbitrators (read: 
methodologists) who can communicate with the suppliers of ideas is an essential ingredient. 
 
3. Is Pluralism a Public Good? – A Policy Maker’s Perspective 
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Still, academic economists expect policy makers to make their decisions based on the best available 
information, information that the academics themselves provide. Obviously, if you think pluralism is 
beneficial in the ivory tower, it surely must be in ‘emergency room’ in Washington DC, Whitehall or 
even in The Hague. You cannot afford to make large mistakes in matters of national or international 
welfare. So the initial answer to the question ‘Is pluralism a public good?’ is ‘yes’. Stimulating 
competition in the market for policy ideas is a necessity. The real world is far too complex to be 
trusted to one gigantic (monopolist) advisor with only one Weltanschauung. 
Still, policy makers are generally economists who were trained in an era in which it was 
preached that economics is ‘Wertfrei’, advice should preferably be given by committees or task 
forces of ‘wise men’ and politics should be left to politicians. And just like Warren Harding the 
thought that crosses the mind about economic advisors is still: “I know somewhere there is an 
economist who knows the truth”. This model of economic advice has a certain ‘Jim-‘ll-fix-it’ ring to 
it, the fairy tale figure of the benign king-philosopher who knows all and fixes all. Needless to say, 
this model of policy making denies the existence of pluralism and if it ever has worked it has only 
worked by sheer luck. So the first thing that has to be taught is that pluralism exists and that 
economic policy making under such circumstances differs markedly from the traditional infinitely lived 
social planner’s model. Given the present-day desire among policy makers for ‘road maps’, ‘blue 
prints’ and ‘action plans’, bringing this subtle message across will be hard enough. 
But let’s suppose that policy makers have survived the shock that economists don’t know 
the truth, what’s to be done next? Policy makers everywhere are pragmatic and they need simple 
rules because in the end they also have to convince their principal, ministers and their ultimate 
principal: Everyman. At this point the world of academia should carry some responsibility in making 
economics an asset. But the largest part of the responsibility should rest on the applied economist. 
What we sometimes forget is that every theory can and ought to be simple. Frank Knight used to say 
that economics is so simple he was surprised why not everybody is a great economist. And of 
course, if you ask many highbrow economist about their key contributions it always seems to be the 
case that their theorems turn out to be simple maxims. But economics has become so specialised and 
technical that it is virtually impossible to cover all territories as an economist. The need for being a 
Renaissance economist is not necessary as long as the key message is brought across in plain 
English. The responsibility for a proper functioning of the market of ideas should rest to some degree 
with the suppliers of ideas. 
 12
But, as mentioned earlier, the largest part of the responsibility should rest with the users of 
ideas. The trick with policy work is not so much about reciting the entire Palgrave by heart, it is by 
having a keen eye for what’s relevant, and as it turns out the gift to apply ideas is perhaps just as 
scarce a commodity as the gift to produce novel ideas. One can linger on at length about this key 
ingredient and try to devise ‘blue prints’ but in the end putting theory into action is a tacit skill. Like 
Sutton (2000) points out, there is more to observing reality with the idea that it is the representation 
of a true equilibrium model plus some ‘random noise’, or what he calls ‘Marshallian tendencies’. 
Alfred Marshall used the metaphor of tides in expounding his view on economics and 
apparently with some authority as most economists of the twentieth century were (and still are) 
persuaded by this image. Tides are influenced by two forces: the gravitational pull of the moon and 
the sun, which can be predicted rather accurately and by meteorological forces which are inherently 
difficult to predict. Luckily the primary forces – the gravitational forces - are far more important and 
by focusing on their own ‘primary forces’ economists can still arrive at a theory that works 
satisfactory although subject to some error. Marshall was aware of the limitations of economic 
science and asserted that economists can only capture tendencies as economic laws are bound to be 
less precise than, e.g., the laws of physics. In that respect we should not be surprised to see that the 
standard paradigm in economics does work in some places (auctions, option pricing) and, of course, 
it does not work in most places as economists with a reflective bend have discovered. Real business 
cycle theorists are, in that respect, betting on the wrong horse. What’s more, policy makers do not 
need - to mix up some phrases of Ronald Coase and Deirdre McCloskey - ‘social blackboard 
engineering: social engineers who look at the economy as a mechanism with the eye of a pure 
mathematician. The last thing a policy maker needs is a logical but senseless policy, or at least a 
policy that does not take account of the fine intricacies of real life economic transactions. The end 
result of such a ‘one size fits all’ attitude is havoc or at least badly designed policies based on badly 
informed policy advice. The number of ‘reasonable’ models is simply infinite and making a choice 
between models has to be supplemented by a skill or tacit knowledge which Keynes once summed 
up neatly in correspondence with Roy Harrod: “Economics is a science of thinking in terms of 
models joined with the art of choosing models which are relevant to the contemporary world.” 
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Yes, but… 
So pluralism is also needed in policy circles, but this time there is an extra proviso to be made, as 
there is more at stake in applying ideas than there is in producing ideas. If someone publishes an 
article on an esoteric subject, which by chance will never trickle down to an audience with a good 
pair of brains, no harm is done. But what if ideas are abused for political reasons or vested interests? 
Poverty amidst plenty, fraud, rent seeking, starvation, crime, you name it, economists can deliver it if 
their advice is not well applied or delivered. The application of economics to economies in transition 
in Eastern Europe and Russia are a case in point. And at this point I would even suggest, just like 
Ronald Coase (1974), that government involvement in regulating the market for ideas has to be far 
larger than regulating the market for, let’s say, cars or petrol. There are essentially two reasons why 
a multiplicity of views in matters of policy is necessary (and perhaps much of what I bring forward 
applies equally to the world of academics) and needs to be ‘regulated’: one is to prevent folly in a 
dogmatic policy environment and the other boils down to safeguarding diversity in the social 
sciences. The first reason is about designing institutions for policy debates that minimise blunders in 
decision making, the other is about designing institutions that stimulate a bio-diversity of views. 
 
1. Institutions for minimising Marches of Folly. Knowledge is not merely information, it is also 
interpretation. As a consequence of this simple observation pluralism is going to be a natural 
state, unless dogmatism rules, i.e. the ‘madmen in authority’ only allow one view and one 
interpretation. This is an extremely dangerous development that is akin to situations one would 
expect in command economies. But as numerous policy watchers have observed in the recent 
past the so-called ‘Washington Consensus’ has dominated every policy debate not only in 
Washington, but perhaps in every OECD country. From time to time, free societies seem equally 
likely to create circumstances or institutions that produce dogmatism. Interpretation of ‘facts’ and 
information is no longer free and is being governed by rules and preconceptions. The 
consequences of such an intellectual deadlock can be seen in The March of Folly (1984) the 
book by historian Barbara Tuchman, who describes how governments pursue policies contrary 
to their own interests, despite the availability of feasible alternatives. To have an open and 
imaginative mind is a valuable good. The selling of spectrum rights took almost 67 years from 
time of invention to application. Ronald Coase remembers how his ideas were classified as a 
joke and the history of economic thought provides us with similar errors in judgement. The path-
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breaking ideas on adverse selection by George Akerlof were initially discarded as ‘trivial stuff’ 
which the editors of the American Economic Review were not in the habit of publishing. 
Friedman’s idea on flexible exchange rates were put away as ridiculous and not realistic. 
 Of course, regulation on the market of ideas smacks of censorship. But it really is about how 
to structure debates when people have different world views. Just like competition among 
different government departments can be a good way to produce information (Tirole 1994) so 
can a policy debate profit from competition in advice or points of view. Dewatripont and Tirole 
(1999) give hints at how such a debate might be framed. The only way out of this situation seems 
to be to organise competition among advisors instead of trusting committees of wise men or by 
merging government departments into one gigantic Bureaucracy. However, competition is not 
sufficient as this competition for the president’s ear has to be supplemented by gatekeepers – 
scientists and journalists – who can tell when the public is taken for a ride by the ‘cons’ among 
us. 
2. Institutions for protecting bio-diversity of views. Having a conversation or a debate in 
matters of policy is only going to be a worthwhile act if a diversity of views exists. Economics 
may perhaps be seen as the Queen of the Social Sciences by its own practitioners, in policy 
circles, economists are still the barbarians who dare to speak of costs and benefits and who dare 
speak of privatising social security or the National Art Gallery. Economists are not listened to 
outside the safe circle of economists and in persuading our ‘significant others’ economists will 
fare better if they listen to what politicians or bureaucrats see as the key problem, how they are 
worried by transition problems, by income distribution and by the excessive use of incentives. 
Politicians have to simultaneously deal with an uncertain and biased policy advice and the other 
way round, policy advisors also have to deal with biased politicians. A bio-diversity of views is 
only going to last if the receiver of the economist’s message can interpret it and apply it. The 
penultimate question is, of course, of how to create such minds. History seems to prove that 
keeping an open mind is not a widespread character trait in policy circles. As Stiglitz (2002, 
chapter 9) observes policy makers from the IMF have substituted economics by ideology. The 
Washington consensus (Williamson, 1994) seems to have played a far too dominant role in 
privatisation, fiscal policy and matters of regulation. Again just like in the case of academic 
economics, having a common language will certainly help but will not be a sufficient condition for 
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attaining an open mind. Innovating the education of economists, and the next section will deal 
with that issue, might help in attaining that goal. 
 
4. Implications for teaching and curricula 
Pluralism in both academia and among policy makers is a desirable characteristic of the economic 
debate. The trouble with economics is that bio-diversity of views is at risk as the standard view – 
whether it be Keynesian in the sixties and seventies or neoclassical in the eighties and nineties – is 
crowding out alternative views. This ‘crowding out’ effect seems to be reinforced the ‘rules of the 
game’ or the incentive structure inside science which favours received views. This is also the reason 
why Frey and Pommerehne (1997) claim that the more interesting developments in economics 
develop and occur outside the walls of the ‘economics department’. The network externalities tied to 
the reigning standard view of the day makes life of dissenting economists hard, but then again being a 
dissenting economist right now may make for the Nobel Prize winner of the distant future.  
How can a modern-day curriculum deal with the desirable aspect of pluralism? The key to 
intellectual exchange inside and outside academia will flourish if we at least share a language. And the 
most sensible thing to do is to share the language of neoclassical economics or good old price theory. 
As Coase (1999) has stressed in a recent lecture: “We will not replace price theory (supply and 
demand and all that) but will put it in a setting that will make it vastly more useful.” 
The use of price theory makes sense, not only from an economic point of view because it 
minimises the switching costs for those who have a ‘foreign’ language (Lazear, 2000) but primarily 
because neo-classical economics deep down embodies the meta-language which economists share: 
equilibrium, rationality and efficiency. But…at the same time the story does not end there, because 
learning the grammar of a language does not imply that you can make conversation from ‘day one’ 
you have mastered the grammar. There is more to economics than mere blackboard economics and 
practitioners seem to understand intuitively. The economics profession turns out more and more 
theorists who seem to lack a reality check on the ordinary business of life. In that respect the 
following quotation by Stephen Roche who heads the global economics division at Morgan Stanley is 
a telling one (cited in Cassidy, 1996): 
 
“We insist on at least a three-to-four year cleansing experience to neutralize the 
brainwashing that takes place in these graduate programs.”  
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Economics has gone astray, at least that is the impression you get if you read the gatekeepers of 
science. Economists toil for the only coin worth having: the applause of their peers. Although this 
mechanism has its merits, it can easily lead economists to believe that the only principal they work for 
is the scientific community or their colleague down the hall. But this is just as wrongheaded as the 
politician who believes that party head office is the principal, and the bureaucrat who looks up to the 
permanent secretary or the minister as his ultimate principal. The ultimate principle in both economics 
and politics is the citizen, or as Klein (2001) describes the citizen: the Everyman. In communicating 
with Everyman a common language is needed. Just like armchair scientists, practitioners – economic 
policy makers and advisors - need to share a language in order to make the entire sequence of 
reasonings clear to the outside world or the Everyman.  
 
Summing up, I acknowledge the need for standards in conversations and debates, in other words a 
common language. Now what does this imply for teaching economics? As anyone with a fair 
understanding of economics can predict, standards have the danger of ‘locking in’, creating path 
dependence. And this is exactly what can happen and perhaps will happen with designing textbooks 
and curricula. Paul Samuelson’s textbook presented a clear break with the post-world war 
textbooks and since that time, textbooks have been more or less variations on the theme set by 
Samuelson. There are exceptions, but by and large most textbook writers follow suit in mimicking 
Samuelson or his modern day equivalent Greg Mankiw. So one of the challenges ahead lies in 
designing a standard curriculum that offers a language for all economic specialisations, but at the 
same time it should be a lively standard that can evolve as time goes by, and insight and experience 
grows. In thinking this through the following six maxims offer a starting point for such a standard:  
 
1. Teach the art of economic policy. Economics is not merely an approach or a language as Gary 
Becker (1975) is wont to say. As Coase (1998) once criticised the economic approach of 
Becker and others: “We study the circulation of the blood without the body.” Studying 
economics by studying the grammar rules isn’t going to yield much insight. Economics is about 
the world outside the ivory tower. And in teaching, as well as in research, I am more and more 
persuaded to see the art of economics revolving around the interaction between Questions – 
Theory – Data (Leamer 1996). Asking the right questions about the data of the real world and in 
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turn choosing models which shed light on these data and questions is a trick that does not come 
easy but it is marriage of principles that produces the best of economics. With all respect for the 
contributions of someone like Gerard Debreu or Frank Hahn, their style of work should not set 
the standard for the teaching practices of economists. The art of economic policy is all about 
mingling normative and positive economics (Colander, 1994) and about discovering the rhetoric 
of economics. In that respect philosophy and methodology should be essential elements of an 
economics curriculum. 
2. Teach economics by learning from the past. Economists sometimes perceive their job as that 
of an engineer and perhaps that is why the outside world also perceives economists just as 
reliable as engineers. The image is however a false one. The age of diminished expectations, as 
dubbed so adequately by Paul Krugman, is riddled with disappointments of social engineering. 
The ultimate question is, of course, why applying economics to real world problems seems to fail 
so miserably. One option is to learn from the past of economists, their thought processes, their 
controversies and the way in which economic circumstances influenced their outlook and advice. 
The debate about sticking to the golden standard in the nineteenth century and following the WW 
I, the best way to tackle the depressions, the restructuring of Europe after WW II, the 
establishment of the EMU and the enlargement of the European Union, the East Asian Crisis, 
and so forth. What this implies for the economics curriculum is that the history of economic 
thought and economic history can (and perhaps should) be taught in tandem. 
3. Teach economics by crossing disciplinary boundaries. In practice this would amount to, by 
lack of a better phrase, economic imperialism. Acting the imperialist does not imply that 
economists should force other disciplines to yield to the Almighty Economist’s methodology. The 
argument to push forward an imperialist attitude in teaching and practising economics hinges on 
four grounds. First of all, economics is a social science in that respect the view you offer students 
should transcend the narrow view of traditional economics in which the family plays a minor role, 
politics is out of the question and values are given once and for all. Second, the element of play 
should also enter the curriculum, as audiences are more apt to listen and learn when you can 
surprise and entertain. A third reason boils down to my claim that when you can play with your 
subject you have mastered it. And last but certainly not the least economics by imperialism helps 
to get a conversation going between disciplines. The prime contribution of economists like 
Lazear, Becker, Greif is that they stimulated controversies across disciplines. Lazear opened the 
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eyes of personnel officers, Becker infuriates demographers and sociologists, and Greif shows 
how the insights of game theory and agency theory can help to understand and reinterpret 
economic history. 
4. Merge business economics with general economics. The issues which are dealt with in business 
administration, public administration and economics are becoming indistinguishable. The jargon 
may differ as well as the level of technical sophistication but essentially all subdisciplines are 
dealing with the same subjects.  Furthermore, the techniques of neo-classical economics are used 
in territories where you might not expect them. The techniques of modern finance are used 
frequently in law and economics, marketing research techniques are used in labour market 
econometrics, and agency theory essentially laid the foundation for looking into questions of 
central bank independence and the efficiency of corporate governance principles. One could go 
on and on with the examples of economic theory which are used in different contexts. The 
message is clear: delineating economics long lines of business and general economics is an 
artificial distinction and no longer serves a purpose. 
5. Practice Reality Economics. Economists, taking their cue from Milton Friedman’s influential 
essay on positive economics, are not very enthused about asking their economic agents what 
goes on inside their black box. One should judge an agent by his actions not by his words is the 
tacit message economists bring across. Preferences do not have to be stated, they will reveal 
themselves by the deeds of agents. The funny thing is that the corner stone of every economist – 
the benefits of the division of labour – was explained by way of recounting the organisation of a 
pin factory. Adam Smith, or should I say his teacher Francis Hutcheson who already used the 
example of the pin factory, discovered the use of reality economics. Economists do not visit the 
pin factories of today and yet it is there that we can really get a feel for what ‘productivity’ and 
‘technical progress’ really is, how it is brought about and how it is destroyed. The main benefit of 
growth accounting is to show how large our ignorance is, and reality economics is one way of 
getting nearer to the truth of the ‘wealth of nations’ than endless growth regressions and 
accounting exercises. Reality economics can improve this stalemate by asking people, listening 
and watching them and finally interpret what people do (with theory in the back of your mind). 
Reality economics or ‘learning by asking’, as Alan Blinder et al. practice in their book Asking 
about Prices (1998) seems to be going through a revival. Ed Lazear (2000) discovered from a 
visit to the Safelite Auto Glass company how a switch from time-rates of pay to piece-rates 
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stimulated productivity. And Truman Bewley (1999) discovered by interviewing business people, 
labour leaders, business consultants and counselors of unemployed why wages are more sticky 
than theory would predict or subscribe. Of course, there have always been economists of name 
and fame who have always practised this art. Alfred Chandler and Ronald Coase are perhaps 
economists that can serve as role models. The basic idea of reality economics, as I would like to 
dub this style of economics, is that it not only offers a source of inspiration but primarily a reality 
check on blue sky theorising. And for the policy economist Reality Economics offers not only 
interesting reading, it is even necessary as I discover more and more. Economists who have to 
make their hands dirty know that ‘blackboard economics’ is not sufficient to persuade their 
audience. Still they muddle through mumbling what the Washington consensus of the day is and 
this in my opinion can improve. Economic policy should move beyond  macroeconomic statistics, 
which in the end can cover up any policy failure an economist  or policy advisor wants to hide. 
Instead they should practice Reality Economics because then they will discover that markets can 
not function without institutions, that privatising the public sector has its limits and that technical 
progress is not something which you discover only in a laboratory but anywhere in society. By 
confronting theory with practice in the most direct manner possible you can make economists 
and policy makers think twice, and ‘thinking twice’ is perhaps the closest one can come to 
creating ‘an open mind’. 
6. Teach basic principles of economics (especially in the bachelors stage) in a Socratic manner. I 
think it is essential for bachelors to develop an intuition for economics by answering the age-old 
dilemmas of economics themselves. That’s in my opinion the only way to get to know the meta-
language of economics and at the same time see its possibilities and limitations. Economic theory 
as taught as a painstaking exercise of solving a hundred constrained maximisation problems is not 
going to get the message of economics across. This is, of course, not an easy task but it can be 
enhanced by using experiments and games (see, e.g., Bergstrom and Miller, 1997; and Holt, 
1999). Recently, a Dutch commission led by Coen Teulings (see report of the ‘Committee 
Teulings’, 2002) came up with a similar advice for the future Dutch economics curriculum in high 
school. Of course, undergraduates in economics should extend their knowledge of basic 
economic principles. But in three years time - which is going to be the standard for becoming a 
bachelor in economics – one can not hope to learn economics in a very profound manner. The 
Masters stage of the economics curriculum is better suited in dealing with the deeper questions of 
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economics. By applying the meta-language of economics in different territories one can see how 
many miles a theory generates and what the pitfalls are of applying a particular theory. 
 
4. Conclusion 
 
“To a person of analytical ability, perceptive enough to realize that mathematical equipment was a 
powerful sword in economics, the world of economics was his oyster in 1935. The terrain was strewn 
with beautiful theorems begging to be picked up and arranged in unified order.”  
 
Paul Samuelson (1972: 160) 
 
Economics was a ‘stinch’ for those who had mastered mathematics and applied it to economic 
problems. Like Paul Samuelson who was reminiscing over the state of economics in the 1930s, the 
new generation of economists could not help it. In a way the mathematical turn in economics was 
also a necessary step as it helped to focus on the essentials of a problem. On that account there is 
nothing wrong with mathematics. The real problem with economics starts when people really believe 
that with a beautiful mind you can solve all the problems in the world. Economic policy is a never a 
‘stinch’, or to rephrase this: economic theory is a necessary element of applying economics but it 
never is sufficient. Still, when you listen close to what Paul Krugman or Tom Sargent have to say you 
will notice that they have fallen prone what Coase calls the vice of ‘blackboard economics’ (see also 
McCloskey, 1997): something is true just because you write (and prove) it on a blackboard. Paul 
Samuelson is a giant just like Adam Smith is a giant, but in retrospect he is exemplary for the 
professionalisation of economics that has taken place. The ‘business of ordinary life’ has on the one 
hand produced specialists who are out of touch with reality and on the other hand specialists who are 
in touch with reality but who throw their hands in despair what’s to be done. Again there are the 
usual exceptions to the rule, but by and large the two-handed economist has become a one-armed 
economist, so much in demand by president Truman, who could not stand the endless “one the 
hand… and on the other hand” of his chairman of the Council of Economic Advisors, Edwin Nourse. 
The present situation amounts to a division of labour on the market for economists that has become 
counterproductive. The Golden Triangle of Questions-Theory-Data is split up among the 
‘specialists’: theorists, measurers and ‘journalists’. Theorists practice blackboard economics, 
econometricioners think that the data tell the whole story (or worse, let the data decide) and the 
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‘journalists’ or ‘travelling salesmen’ among us ask perhaps the right questions but they cannot back 
up their story by a frame of mind and the data to support it. 
 Economics may therefore appear as an easy subject, putting theory into action is an entirely 
different matter. Besides knowing your way around economic theory and statistics, you need the eye 
of a biologist, the sharpness of a spin doctor, the brashness of an investigative journalist, the ability to 
make an argument ‘sing’ like a poet, the gift of the gab of an orator, the stubbornness of a lone wolf 
and last but not least the common sense of the man-in-the-street. Of course, we can’t all be this 
Utopian economist, even though some economists score good points on a number of dimensions. 
The best we can do is change our habits. Every conversation in economics that values pluralism as a 
public good is in need of a standard language. However, at the same time this standard should be 
language that adapts and evolves as experience grows. Price theory offers such a language (so, first 
of all, teach the Basics of Economics) and it can evolve by confronting theory with reality (by 
teaching and practising Reality Economics), by confronting the present ideas with the lessons from 
the past (by practising and linking History of economic thought with economic history), by 
confronting the insights from economics with that of other disciplines (by practising Imperialist 
Economics). By confronting theory with reality not only can economics become a more interesting 
subject for insiders and outsiders it will also make the users of economics think twice which is 
synonymous for ‘having an open mind’. In short, changing course will perhaps not bring the truth any 
closer that Warren Harding was after, but it certainly will prevent the economist from making big 
mistakes and make economics the social science it deserves to be. “God, what a job!” 
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